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Abstract
We examine how production flexibility affects financial leverage. A worldwide sample
of energy utilities allows us to apply direct measures for production flexibility based
on their power plants. We find that production flexibility increases financial leverage.
For identification, we exploit privatizations and deregulations of electricity markets,
geographical variations in natural resources, the technological evolution of gas-fired
power plants, and differences in electricity prices and recapitalization cost across
regions. Production flexibility affects financial leverage via the channels of reduced
expected cost of financial distress and higher present value of tax shields. The
relative importance of these channels depends on firms’ profitability. (JEL G30,
G32)
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This paper analyzes the relationship between production flexibility and financial
leverage. We focus on one particular aspect of production flexibility: the ability to
easily adjust production volume. A related concept is operating leverage. In fact,
production flexibility can be interpreted as a form of operating flexibility on the asset
level that influences operating leverage. We overcome the challenge of measuring
production flexibility by focusing on energy utilities. Detailed data on more than
30,000 current and past power plants allow us to construct two direct measures of
production flexibility: average run-up time and ramp-up cost. These are based on
production technologies of the firms’ different power plants. For example, gas-fired
power plants have higher production flexibility than nuclear or coal power plants.
Flexible firms are able to adjust the production volume quickly and at low cost,
enabling them to avoid operating losses by stopping production whenever price falls
below marginal cost.
Theoretically, production flexibility may increase the tax benefits of debt financ-
ing and reduce the expected cost of financial distress by lowering default risk. This
idea was formalized in the models of Mauer and Triantis (1994) and Aivazian and
Berkowitz (1998). In the context of operating leverage, the related idea of a trade-off
between financial and operating leverage goes back to Van Horne (1977). Similar to
higher production flexibility, lower operating leverage reduces firms’ expected cost
of financial distress.
The literature mainly supports the hypothesis of a substitution effect between
operating and financial leverage (e.g., Ferri and Jones 1979; Mandelker and Rhee
1984; Kahl et al. 2014). The empirical measurement, however, varies between dif-
ferent studies. Whereas Novy-Marx (2011) defines operating leverage as operating
costs divided by assets, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) approximate the degree of op-
erating leverage as the “percentage change in X [EBIT] that is associated with a
given percentage change in the units produced and sold” (49). MacKay (2003) an-
alyzes volume flexibility, which he defines as “the elasticity of cash flow to output
level” (1,140) and finds a negative relationship between production flexibility and
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leverage.1 The proxies that have been applied in the literature are mainly indirect
and/or based on (past) realizations of demand, profits, or cost. This, however, leads
to several problems, and the challenge of measuring operating flexibility is not yet
finally resolved.2
We provide a novel direct measure for production flexibility, which is based on
asset-level characteristics instead of on past realizations. This measure has several
advantages. First, it captures not only realizations of flexibility but also the possi-
bility of reacting to changing market conditions. For financing decisions, realizations
may be less important as they are backward looking. Rather, the future flexibility
should be most important when firms decide about their financing structure. Second,
our proxy needs no time-series history for estimation and thus avoids the assumption
of constant effects over the estimation period. Third, our measure changes over time
due to plant openings and closures. This creates observable time-series variation and
allows us to apply firm fixed effects. Fourth, the direct interpretation and detailed
data about firms’ production assets make it easier to address endogeneity concerns.
Fifth, our proxy is—at least in the short run—neither directly influenced by ac-
counting practices (e.g, depreciation) nor by managerial decisions (e.g., hedging) or
economic conditions (e.g., shifts in demand). This makes our measure comparable
across different countries and over time, which is more difficult for proxies that are
indirect and/or based on past realizations. We exploit this advantage by analyz-
ing how characteristics of different power markets affect the impact of production
flexibility on leverage.
To empirically investigate the relationship between financial leverage and pro-
1MacKay (2003) argues that the negative impact of asset substitution and risk shifting outweighs
increased debt capacity. However, the former aspects are unlikely to be highly relevant in our setting
because neither risk shifting nor asset substitution is easily possible in the context of power plants
(as their construction and mothballing takes time, is easily observable, and can be regulated in debt
contracts). This may explain why we find a positive impact of production flexibility on leverage.
2O’Brian and Vanderheiden (1987), for instance, criticize traditional measures as “certain pop-
ular proxy measures for DOL may not be theoretically sound” (50). Dugan et al. (1994) state that
“an inconsistency appears to exist between the underlying assumptions of the time-series regression
estimation techniques and the theoretical implications of the ‘tradeoff’ hypothesis” (333). Chen
et al. (2011) argue that “measures are backward looking, but the concept of operating leverage in
its nature is forward looking” (30).
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duction flexibility, we start by performing pooled OLS and firm fixed effects re-
gressions. All models point at a positive relationship. For identification, we first
exploit the deregulation of electricity markets and the wave of privatizations in the
1990s as exogenous shocks. Financing was unlikely to influence production assets
before deregulation and privatization because (1) public ownership enabled utilities
to access capital via the state and/or (2) the absence of competition allowed them to
finance even large-scale projects without significant risk in a cost-plus pricing regime.
These days, production assets have been heavily influenced by political preferences
(Peltzman and Winston 2000). For example, the high prevalence of nuclear power
plants in France goes back to the plan of the former French Prime Minister Pierre
Messmer to give priority to nuclear electricity (“Messmer plan”). Thus, production
assets of energy utilities before privatization and deregulation can be regarded as be-
ing independent of financing decisions. Using pre-deregulation and pre-privatization
production flexibility as instruments confirms the prior results.
As a second identification strategy, we apply natural reserves of coal, gas, and
oil in U.S. states as instruments. For example, higher gas reserves are expected to
lead to the construction of more flexible gas-fired power plants. At the same time,
natural resource reserves are plausibly exogenous as they are unlikely to influence
firms’ capital structures directly. Rather, they represent a given physical feature of
a region. Both IV approaches confirm a positive impact of production flexibility on
leverage. To further reduce concerns about omitted variables, we present additional
tests, which focus on asset salability, regional diversification, technology concen-
tration, asset age, and asset lifetime. We also exploit the technological evolution of
gas-fired power plants during the 2000s. This evolution led to higher plant flexibility
and thus a higher impact of gas-fired power plants over time.
As a final identification approach, we examine the impact of electricity price
characteristics and recapitalization cost. If their impact is in line with theoretical
predictions, alternative explanations or omitted variables are unlikely to drive our
results. We first analyze electricity price volatility. Intuitively, production flexibility
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would have no value if price volatility would be zero because production volume
would never be adjusted to price changes. Hourly electricity prices for power markets
in 23 countries allow us to test this prediction empirically. In line with expectations,
the positive impact of production flexibility is amplified by more volatile electricity
prices. Second, we expect a higher impact of production flexibility if the variable
production costs of a firm are similar to the electricity price. If the price is much
higher or lower than the variable costs, production volume is rarely adjusted and
flexibility has little value. Indeed, we find that the effect of production flexibility is
highest if the variable costs of a firm are similar to the price of electricity in this
region. Third, in line with the predictions of Mauer and Triantis (1994), we find
that the impact of production flexibility is less pronounced if recapitalization costs
are low. Intuitively, production flexibility is less important if firms can issue new
equity more quickly.
After analyzing the relationship between production flexibility and financial
leverage in general, we shed light on the channels via which production flexibil-
ity may affect leverage. Both theoretical models discuss a higher value of (future)
tax shields and lower distress risk in this context. Exploiting staggered deregulation
across U.S. states yields evidence that the impact of production flexibility on lever-
age increases with default risk. Analysis of competitive markets around the globe
also shows that this impact is more pronounced if competition is severe, volatility of
equity returns is high, and price hedging is difficult. Splitting firms into subsamples
based on their profitability reveals that this channel is mainly relevant for less prof-
itable firms. Analyzing differences in corporate taxes across countries/states and
time, we find evidence that the impact of production flexibility increases with taxes.
This effect, however, is mainly relevant for more profitable firms. Overall, our re-
sults indicate that production flexibility affects financial leverage via tax shields and
distress risk. However, the importance of these channels differs across firms. For
more profitable firms, the tax channel is of first-order importance. For less profitable
firms, the distress risk channel matters most.
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This focus on energy utilities has several advantages besides the direct measure-
ment of production flexibility. First, they produce and sell mainly one product,
that is electricity. Thus, their flexibility with regard to power generation is a reli-
able measure of their overall level of production flexibility. Second, technologies for
electricity generation are highly standardized and limited in number, allowing us
to assign a technology-specific value for run-up time and ramp-up cost. Third, the
high entry barriers in the energy utilities industry reduce concerns that our results
are affected by new firms, which may, for example, focus on more flexible and less
expensive production assets.
Single industry studies come, however, also at a cost. Although we are not the
first to use a sample based on energy utilities (e.g., Perez-Gonzalez and Yun 2013),
regulation may be a concern. As with many other industries, these firms are reg-
ulated to some extent. However, the majority of this regulation nowadays focuses
on factors that do not directly impact financing decisions (e.g., access to the grid).
Nevertheless, we follow several strategies to alleviate concerns that the results are
biased by peculiarities of energy utilities. First, country-year and firm fixed effects
control for any country-year-specific or time-invariant impact of regulation. Second,
we restrict our analysis to firms located in regions with liquid wholesale markets for
electricity. Their introduction is often regarded as the last step in the liberalization
process. Third, we control for public ownership, supplier concentration, and restrict
the sample to rather homogenous European power markets. We also challenge our
proxy for production flexibility along several dimensions. Among others, we consec-
utively remove single technologies to ensure that our results are not driven by one
particular power plant type (e.g., nuclear), apply cost and cash flow-based measures
for operating flexibility, and adjust the flexibility for the age of the power plants.
All these robustness tests confirm our prior results. We also show that production
flexibility is economically relevant for energy utilities.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we apply a novel, asset-
based flexibility measure and show that production flexibility increases financial
5
leverage. We also present identification strategies to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
Our findings reveal that operating characteristics are of pronounced importance for
firms’ financial decision making. This adds to the literature on operating flexibility
and financial leverage (e.g., Mandelker and Rhee 1984; MacKay 2003; Kahl et al.
2014), employment flexibility (e.g., Hanka 1998; Chen et al. 2011; Kuzmina 2013),
and operating leverage in general (e.g, Petersen 1994; Novy-Marx 2011). Second, we
present novel evidence on how market characteristics affect the impact of operating
flexibility on leverage. We find strong evidence that this impact depends on product
market characteristics, such as price volatility. In this regard, we also contribute to
the literature on product markets and firm behavior (e.g., Kovenock and Phillips
1997; Hoberg and Phillips 2010; Matsa 2011). Third, our findings contribute to the
literature on leverage and expected cost of financial distress as we shed light on the
impact of production (in)flexibility as a source of distress risk (e.g., Bradley et al.
1984; Titman and Wessels 1988).
1. Production Flexibility and Financial Leverage
Production flexibility has many dimensions. For example, the ability to easily
switch between different products or adjust features of products can be regarded as
production flexibility. We focus on one particular aspect: the ability to adjust pro-
duction volume. Firms react to price changes by increasing or decreasing production
volume. Flexible firms are able to do this quickly and at low cost, for example, by
shutting down and restarting production facilities. A related concept is operating
leverage, which can be defined as the “use of fixed costs in the firm’s production
scheme” (Ferri and Jones 1979, 632). Similarly, Aivazian and Berkowitz (1998) de-
fine operating leverage as a “commitment to ex-ante production” (2). By contrast,
production flexibility in their model is the ability to adjust output ex post. This
shows that there is a link between production flexibility and operating leverage.
Production flexibility can be seen as a form of operating flexibility (besides, e.g.,
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labor flexibility) on the asset level that influences operating leverage.3
With regard to financial leverage, we hypothesize that production flexibility may
affect financial leverage via two possible channels: lower distress risk and higher
present values of (future) tax shields. Under the strict Modigliani-Miller assump-
tions, capital structure decisions are irrelevant and production flexibility should play
no role. However, firms trade off the benefits and cost of leverage if, for example,
tax benefits of debt financing and cost of financial distress exist. In this context,
production flexibility can have two effects: it may increase the tax benefits of debt
financing and reduce expected cost of financial distress by lowering default risk. In-
tuitively, firms with high production flexibility are able to avoid operating losses
by stopping production whenever price falls below marginal cost. By contrast, less
flexible firms can suffer from operating losses because they cannot stop production
immediately.
For Figure 1, we assume a random electricity price P (which cannot be predicted
by firms), constant marginal cost MC, and two otherwise identical firms with either
a high or low flexibility.4 Whenever P>MC (P<MC), the firm rationally decides to
start (stop) production. For the high flexibility firm, we assume no lag between the
production decision and actual production adjustment. This lag is three hours for
the low flexibility firm. In this example, the high flexibility firm never experiences
operating losses (Figure 1A), in contrast to the low flexibility firm (B).
— Figure 1 about here —
Thus, higher production flexibility allows firms to avoid operating losses, thereby
3Production flexibility is related to cost structures as they are likely different for flexible and
inflexible plants. This was already described by Stigler (1939), who argues that “flexibility will not
be a ‘free good’: A plant certain to operate at X units of output per week will surely have lower
costs at that output than will a plant designed to be passably efficient from X/2 to 2X units per
week” (311). In a robustness test, we explicitly consider cost structures to analyze how they affect
our findings for production flexibility (cf. Section 3.4.3).
4For this simple example, we assume that firms differ in start/stop time but have no start/stop
cost. Furthermore, the assumption of constant variable production cost, but stochastic electricity
prices over short periods is related to the fact that energy utilities often fix part of their production
cost, for example, via long-term supply contracts. Furthermore, short-term fluctuations of electricity
prices are heavily driven by demand shocks, for example, due to unexpected weather.
7
reducing distress risk and expected cost of financial distress.5 This idea is formalized
in the models of Mauer and Triantis (1994) and Aivazian and Berkowitz (1998). In
the former model, a firm produces a commodity with a stochastic price. The firm
has the option to start and stop production for a certain cost. It can also adjust
its capital structure by issuing debt and equity, and this causes recapitalization
cost. The authors find “that higher production flexibility (due to lower costs of
shutting down and reopening a production facility) enhances the firm’s debt capacity
[...]” (1,253). Aivazian and Berkowitz (1998) draw similar conclusions. Production
flexibility also enhances firms’ present value of tax shields in these models. Thus,
firms with higher production flexibility may choose higher financial leverage due to
their lower default risk and/or higher present value of tax shields.
Several market/country characteristics may affect the impact of production flexi-
bility on leverage. In particular, the volatility of the product price plays a crucial role
in the model of Mauer and Triantis (1994). Intuitively, production flexibility would
have no value if volatility was zero as firms would never change their production de-
cision. When volatility increases, the impact of production flexibility becomes more
important (see C and D). Again, the high flexibility firm avoids operating losses.
The low flexibility firm, however, generates only losses due to the lag between the
production decision and actual start/stop. The impact of production flexibility may
also be more pronounced if electricity prices are close to a firm’s marginal produc-
tion cost. In such a situation, production is frequently started and stopped (see E
and F). Lastly, recapitalization cost also play an important role in the Mauer and
Triantis (1994) model.6 They predict a substitution effect between production flexi-
bility and low recapitalization cost. In particular, they state that “when the costs to
dynamically manage capital structure are small, the hedging benefit of production
5In a similar vein, Petersen (1994) argues based on MacKie-Mason (1990) that “[f]irms with
more variable cash flows will find that the tax shields are less valuable and the expected costs of
financial distress are higher. Accordingly, these firms have less debt in their capital structure” (364).
6Mauer and Triantis (1994) denote firms with low recapitalization cost as being financially flex-
ible. We will not use the term “financial flexibility” in this context as recent literature (e.g., Denis
and McKeon 2012) often denotes firms that preserve (parts of) their debt capacity for future bor-
rowing as being financially flexible.
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flexibility has less of an impact [...].” (1272). Thus, production flexibility should be
less important if firms can easily issue equity in response to negative shocks.
2. Data
2.1. Sample construction
The sample covers energy stock-market-listed utilities from all over the world.
For its compilation, we start by combining lists of active and inactive utility com-
panies from OneBanker and Datastream, both products of Thomson Reuters. The
sample is organized as unbalanced panel and covers the years 2002 to 2009, the pe-
riod for which we can obtain the necessary data on firms’ production assets.7 This
final sample, for which we require data on leverage and production assets, covers
2,449 firm-year observations from 460 firms, located in more than fifty countries.
2.2. Production flexibility
Before explaining the calculation of the measures for production flexibility, we
introduce the World Electric Power Plants (WEPP) database and provide details
on the matching process.
2.2.1. The WEPP database. All information on firms’ production assets is based
on the WEPP database, which is published annually by Platts. This comprehensive
database contains power plants of all sizes and technologies around the globe. Prac-
titioners, such as analysts of energy utilities and management consultants, regularly
use this database. It includes information on single power plant units, such as their
production technologies, capacities, geographic locations, start dates of commercial
operation, and their owners/operators.8
7Several steps are conducted to ensure the adequacy of this sample for our purposes. First, we
eliminate all firms without a primary security classified as equity (5 firms). Second, all companies
that were never active between 2002 and 2009 are excluded (138 firms). Third, and to ensure that
our sample only covers companies that focus on the generation of electricity, we check the industry
classification of all utilities. For this, we mainly rely on their SIC and ICB codes. In total, we
eliminate 426 firms that do not fulfill our criteria of an energy utility. These removed firms are,
among others, utilities specialized in water supply or gas transmission.
8A detailed description of the database is provided by Platts’ Data Base Description and Research
Methodology (www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/downloads/udi/wepp/descmeth.pdf). Concern-
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We rely on this database because information on production assets reported by
energy utilities on their Web sites or annual reports has several drawbacks. First,
relevant data are often not available because there are no disclosure requirements.
Second, there is no standardized disclosure. Hence, firms may engage in selective
reporting. Third, even if firms report details on their production assets, the level of
detail differs substantially. Consequently, we rely exclusively on the WEPP database
to obtain detailed and unbiased data on firms’ production assets.
The problem, however, with this database is that all data are unconsolidated
and reported for single power plant units. Hence, it is necessary to match the
single power plants to our sample firms. We conduct this by manually matching
the WEPP database item Company to the names of our sample companies.9 It is
important to note that we use the edition of the WEPP database that corresponds
to the respective sample year. Hence, we use eight different editions of this database.
Relying only on the most recent version could cause bias because the most recent
owner reported in the database might not necessarily have been the past owner. For
example, the ownership of a power plant can change due to defaults and subsequent
asset sales, mergers, or asset deals.
Table 1 provides an overview on the data included in the WEPP database.
In total, 114,664 power plants are included in 2009. They account for an overall
capacity of 4,732 GW. This figure is consistent with the International Energy Agency
(IEA 2011), which reports an installed capacity of 4,957 GW for 2009. We are able
ing the coverage of the database, Platts states that “[t]he WEPP Data Base covers electric power
plants in every country in the world and includes operating, projected, deactivated, retired, and
canceled facilities. Global coverage is comprehensive for medium- and large-sized power plants of
all types. Coverage for wind turbines, diesel and gas engines, photovoltaic (PV) solar systems, fuel
cells, and mini- and micro-hydroelectric units is considered representative, but is not exhaustive in
many countries. Nonetheless, about a quarter of the data base consists of units of less than 1 MW
capacity. Generating units of less than 1 kW are not included” (5). Thus, we consider the database
to be representative for our analysis. With regard to the owner/operator of the power plants, Platts
states that “[a]s a general matter, the listed COMPANY is both the operator and sole or majority
owner” (10).
9Since the WEPP database item Company does not necessarily equal a company name in our
sample, but might be a subsidiary of such a company, we also use a subsidiaries list for our sample
firms in the matching process. If a subsidiary is owned by more than one company in the sample,
we assume that all owners hold equal parts of this subsidiary.
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to match more than 50% of the installed capacity, that is about 2,500 GW, and
approximately 30% of all power plants to the energy utilities in our sample. This
outcome does not seem implausible because our sample only covers listed companies.
— Table 1 about here —
2.2.2. Production flexibility measures. Based on the information about single
power plants, we construct two main measures of production flexibility: run-up time
and ramp-up cost. These capture the start/stop time and cost of specific technolo-
gies. Higher Run-up time is expected to decrease a firm’s production flexibility. The
values used for the calculation, their sources, and the fraction of each production
technology are shown in Table 2. We define the average run-up time of company i
as follows:
Run-up timei =
∑M
k=1 Capacityk · Run-up timek∑M
k=1 Capacityk,
(1)
where k denotes a production technology and M the number of different technologies
of an energy utility. As a second measure, we use Ramp-up costs. These are the
cost for a hot start of a power plant. More expensive shutdowns and restarts are
expected to decrease production flexibility. Thus, higher values of ramp-up cost go
along with lower production flexibility. This definition is very similar to the one
used by Mauer and Triantis (1994), who argue that “costs of shutting down and
reopening a production facility” (1,253) determines production flexibility. We define
average ramp-up costs of company i as follows:
Ramp-up costsi =
∑M
k=1 Capacityk · Ramp-up costsk∑M
k=1 Capacityk.
(2)
Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1. In Appendix A,
we illustrate the calculation of the production variables with an example.
— Table 2 about here —
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2.3. Financial variables
Our main Leverage measure is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the
book value of equity. Alternative leverage definitions are applied in a robustness test.
The variables for which we control in all regressions are size, profitability, tangibility,
and growth opportunities (Frank and Goyal 2009). Our results are similar if we also
include alternative control variables like earnings volatility, cash flow volatility, or a
dividend payer dummy. Variable definitions can be found in Table A1. To account
for country- and year-specific effects, for example, taxes or regulation, we include
country and year or country-year fixed effects. Firm-years with obvious data errors
are not considered, that is, we demand that the leverage is between zero and one,
that Profitability is higher than minus one, and that Market-to-book is higher than
zero. To restrict the impact of outliers, all financial variables are winsorized at the
1% and 99% levels.
2.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for several variables, averaged from 2002
to 2009. Average run-up time is 2.77 hours and varies between 0.08 hours for the
25% percentile and three hours for the 75% percentile. The mean ramp-up cost
are 28.05 eper MW. Furthermore, average fixed cost are about 61% of total cost.
Slightly more than 20% of all energy utilities operate plants in more than one country
and most own plants with different generation technologies. The mean lifetime of
plants is about 37 years, and they are on average about 20 years old. For the median
firm, there are about five other companies operating plants with the same technology
in a region and year as potential buyers. With regard to the hourly electricity prices,
we observe an average volatility of 24% and a mean price of 48.35 USD/MWh, which
is slightly above average variable production cost. The average book leverage in our
sample is 43%.
— Table 3 about here —
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3. Empirical Results
3.1. Methodology
The main estimation methodologies in this section are pooled OLS and firm
fixed effects regressions. The pooled OLS model includes year and country fixed
effects. To control for country-year-specific effects like electricity demand, we also
use country-year fixed effects (Gormley and Matsa 2014). Alternatively, we apply
a firm-fixed effects regression, which includes a firm-specific fixed effect αi and year
fixed effects. To ensure that all regressors are in the information set of the dependent
variable, they are lagged by one year. Due to the panel structure of our data, we
apply cluster-robust Huber/White standard errors (White 1980), which are adjusted
for clustering within firms (Petersen 2009). If country or power market variables,
such as electricity price volatility, are included in a regression, standard errors are
adjusted for clustering within countries or markets.
3.2. First results
First results for the relationship between production flexibility and capital struc-
ture are reported in Table 4. Flexibility is measured by run-up time in model 1.
We control for country and year fixed effects in model 1a. As there might be fac-
tors that vary over time within countries, we include country-year fixed effects in
model 1b. Thus, this model controls for any demand side effects, such as industry
structure in a country and year. Model 1c includes firm-fixed effects; thus, it con-
trols for all time-invariant firm characteristics. All specifications indicate a negative
relationship between run-up time and leverage. Because higher values for run-up
time go along with lower production flexibility, this provides evidence for positive
relationship between leverage and production flexibility.
The impact of run-up time on leverage is economically important. Based on
the firm-fixed effects estimates, a hypothetical firm with only gas-fired power plants
would have a leverage that is about 5% (in absolute terms) higher than an otherwise
identical utility with only lignite-fired power plants. As another example, there
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would be a nearly a 10% difference between two hypothetical energy utilities, with
one having only oil and the other one only waste-fired power plants. A one-standard-
deviation increase in run-up time leads to about a 4% decrease in leverage. The
corresponding figures for tangibility and profitability are, for comparison, below 3%.
Results for the ramp-up cost in model 2 are of similar statistical and economic
significance. Control variables are discussed in Section 3.3.1. Overall, these findings
indicate a strong link between production flexibility and leverage.
— Table 4 about here —
These results so far do not allow us to draw conclusions on causality. Identifica-
tion strategies are presented in Section 4. Before that, we challenge the robustness
of these first results along three dimensions: generalizability, measurement of pro-
duction flexibility, and miscellaneous.
3.3. Generalizability
Unlike the majority of empirical studies in corporate finance, our sample only
includes energy utilities. We are, however, not the first to focus on this industry.
Fabrizio et al. (2007), for instance, analyze if markets reduce costs based on energy
utilities. Becher et al. (2012) investigate corporate mergers, and Perez-Gonzalez and
Yun (2013) use energy utilities to disentangle the value contribution of risk manage-
ment with derivatives. Furthermore, the mechanism of how production flexibility
affects leverage is not specific to the energy utility industry. Rather, adjusting pro-
duction volume to price fluctuations is common in most manufacturing industries.
For example, steel producers may react to a price decline by reducing production
of their factories. Thus, similar patterns are likely to exist in other manufacturing
industries as well. Nevertheless, we provide several additional tests for the general-
izability of our results.
3.3.1. Determinants of leverage. We first investigate whether the factors deter-
mining leverage are systematically different for this industry. As shown in Table 4,
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size and tangibility have a positive impact on leverage. For profitability, we find a
negative influence. These findings are in line with prior empirical studies based on
multi-industry samples. For market-to-book, we detect a positive impact.10 Overall,
this indicates that financial leverage in the utility industry is determined by similar
factors as in other (nonfinancial) industries.
3.3.2. Regulation. Regulation may be a concern with the energy utility industry.
However, the energy utility industry is largely deregulated in most countries nowa-
days (Dewenter and Malatesta 1997).11 It is also important to note that we only
focus on stock-market-listed energy utilities. However, some aspects not directly
related to financing can still be influenced by regulation. For example, grid access
fees are often determined by federal entities (cf. Section 4.1 for a more compre-
hensive discussion of regulation). However, a certain degree of regulation exists in
most industries. Among others, in the United States the drug admission process
is regulated by the FDA, the chemical industry has to fulfill the Toxic Substances
Control Act, and firms have to comply with rules set by the FTC.
To control for any country-level regulation, we apply firm fixed effects and pooled
OLS regressions with country, year, and country-year fixed effects, which capture
unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time (Gormley and Matsa 2014).
Thus, we control for country-specific factors like electricity grid in all models. The
firm fixed effects regression controls for all time-invariant firm-specific factors. As all
models indicate a positive relationship between production flexibility and leverage,
omitted variables related to regulation are unlikely to bias our results.
Although there is a high degree of deregulation in most countries, we additionally
10At first glance, this is surprising as prior literature mainly supports a negative relationship.
However, as also indicated by Frank and Goyal (2009), this effect is not reliable for book leverage, but
only for market leverage. For the latter, we also find a negative impact in OLS models. Furthermore,
this finding may simply reflect that growth opportunities of energy utilities are mostly limited. Chen
and Zhao (2006) show that the impact of market-to-book on book leverage is positive for most firms
and that a negative effect is driven by a small number of firms with very high market-to-book ratios.
11In the United States, deregulation initiatives started in the late 1980s (e.g., Ovtchinnikov 2010).
However, the deregulation process is still ongoing in many U.S. states. A more detail discussion of
deregulation in the United States is provided in Section 5.2.
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construct a subsample of firms operating in markets for which we find clear evidence
that the deregulation process is far advanced. As it is impossible to identify a
particular year in which an electricity market was deregulated, because this is a
step-wise process, we focus on the introduction of a competitive wholesale market
for electricity. This is commonly regarded as the last step in the liberalization
process. As no nation-wide electricity markets exist in the United States, Canada,
and Australia, we focus on single states in these countries. We use a press and Web
search to obtain the necessary information. If we find no convincing evidence for the
existence of a competitive wholesale market, we conservatively assume that there is
no such market. Figure 2 shows whether there was a competitive wholesale market
in at least one year during our sample period for all sample countries/states.
— Figure 2 about here —
To test the impact of regulation, we now only include observations if a com-
petitive wholesale market for electricity existed in the particular region and year.
Results can be found in Table 5, model 1. Alternatively, we only include firms lo-
cated in regions in which such a market exists since 2002 in model 2. The firm
fixed effects regressions confirm our prior findings of a positive link between produc-
tion flexibility and leverage. Compared to the full sample, the economic impact of
our measures for production flexibility is even higher in this setting. This provides
further evidence that our results are not driven by regulation.
— Table 5 about here —
3.3.3. Market structure and public ownership. There may be significant het-
erogeneity between different power markets, even in deregulated markets. As it
is impossible to control for all potentially relevant factors, we follow a different
approach to mitigate concerns that this biases our findings. In particular, we fo-
cus exclusively on deregulated markets in the European Union (plus Norway and
Switzerland). These markets underwent a rather homogenous deregulation process
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based on the E.U. directive 96/92/EC.12 The aim of this directive was to estab-
lish “common rules for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity.”
Thus, power markets that were formed on the basis of this directive are likely rather
similar. Results are presented in model 3. They show that the outcome for this
subsample is very similar to our main findings.
Next, we analyze the impact of public ownership. For historical reasons, in
most countries public ownership is still more common for energy utilities than for
firms from other industries. Information on firms’ owners comes from the Thomson
Reuters Global Ownership database. This allows us to construct a dummy variable
Public ownership, which equals one if the state or any public entity is among the
three largest shareholders. This is the case in about 10% of all firm-years. In
model 4, we include this indicator variable for public ownership as an additional
control variable. Its impact is, however, insignificant and the effect of production
flexibility remains unchanged. We thus conclude that public ownership does not
bias the prior results.
Finally, we analyze whether supplier concentration affects our findings. It could
be argued that firms with a very high market share (e.g., monopoly suppliers) cannot
use their production flexibility as they have to ensure sufficient power supply and
grid stability. To test this, we construct a subsample of firms that account for
less than 10% of total installed production capacity in a country/state and year
(model 5). Again, we find similar and even stronger results. Thus, we conclude that
supplier concentration does not bias our findings.
3.4. Measurement of Production Flexibility
Next, we analyze whether the results are biased by measurement errors of pro-
duction flexibility. For example, it may be that the impact of a specific technology on
leverage is not related to production flexibility, but to other (omitted) characteristics
12In 1995, electricity markets in the European Union were largely regulated. In 1996, the E.U.
directive 96/92/EC demanding that all member states deregulate their electricity markets was
issued. In the early 2000s, the majority of all E.U. markets were deregulated.
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of this technology. Furthermore, nuclear may be special along several dimensions,
for example, environmental risk. Thus, we start by consecutively excluding firms
owning at least one plant with the following technologies: coal, gas, nuclear, and
oil. Models 1 to 4 in Table 6 show that the magnitude and statistical significance of
the coefficient for run-up time remains rather unchanged when the technologies are
excluded. The results for ramp-up cost in Table A2 are similar. We conclude that
the impact of production flexibility on leverage represents a general effect that does
not depend on any specific technology.
— Table 6 about here —
3.4.1. Active dispatching. Another possible concern is that some power plants
are not actively switched on and off. In particular, wind and solar plants produce
electricity whenever there is wind or sun. There is no active dispatching of such
power plants. To a smaller extent, this concern also applies to hydro power plants.
To analyze whether this biases our results, we exclude all firm-years of utilities
operating any of these three technologies. Results in model 5, Table 6 again confirm
the prior findings. The coefficient for run-up time is even higher as in our base
specification. Thus, not actively managed power plants do not bias our findings.
3.4.2. Power plant age. Our proxies for production flexibility may be imprecise
because we assign the same flexibility values to all power plants within one technol-
ogy class, independent of the age of the power plants. In reality, however, newer
plants tend to be more efficient and also more flexible (cf. Section 4.4 for a discus-
sion of technological changes). Thus, we adjust the production flexibility to the age
of the specific power plant in this robustness test.13 The empirical results, which
are shown in Table 7, model 1, are very similar as those in our main specifications.
— Table 7 about here —
13The adjustment factors come from Ellersdorfer (2009) and are based on the construction time
of the power plant (i.e., before 1975, 1975 to 1985, 1986 to 1995, and after 1995).
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3.4.3. Cost-based measures. Most traditional measures for operating leverage
focus on cost structures. In this test, we analyze whether our results change if
we control for such measures. For this purpose, we first construct a measure for
Operating cost, which is based on accounting data. It is defined as the cost of
goods sold (COGS), plus selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by
total assets (Novy-Marx 2011). The second measure we use is Fixed cost, which
is based on plant-level data. It considers the average fixed and variable costs of
the production technologies of a firm’s power plants and is calculated as fixed cost
divided by the sum of fixed and variable costs. Fixed costs include capital cost, and
variable costs include costs for fuel.14 Results are reported in Table 7, model 2. Even
after controlling for cost structures, we find a strong positive impact of production
flexibility on leverage. This is in line with the view that traditional proxies fail to
capture the full effect of production flexibility as they are indirect, backward looking,
and unable to measure unrealized flexibility.
3.4.4. Cash flow-based measures. Our measures for production flexibility are
based on firms’ production assets. Alternatively, cash-flow-based measures can be
used to approximate operating flexibility. For example, MacKay (2003) uses the
elasticity of cash flow to output as empirical proxy for volume flexibility. As argued
in the introduction, our measure has several advantages, for example, because it
is forward looking. Nevertheless, we compare our proxies with a cash-flow-based
measure and follow the idea of MacKay (2003) to estimate the elasticity of cash flow
to output with the help of firm-level regressions.15 The empirical results in Table 7,
model 3, show that the cash-flow-based measure is insignificant in all specifications.
Our proxies, however, are of high statistical significance and confirm the previous
14Data come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and refers to U.S. power
plants. As prices for fuel vary between countries, our measure may not be perfectly representative
for all markets. However, we argue that it is a reasonable approximation. Values for fixed cost are
summarized in Table 2.
15In particular, we estimate the following model for each firm with more than two observations:
ln(cashflow)t = α+ ln(output)t+ut. Following MacKay (2003), the firm-specific proxy for volume
flexibility is then calculated as abs[ln()].
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findings. This indicates that our findings are related to using a forward-looking
proxy for production flexibility.
3.4.5. Economic relevance. The economic relevance of ramp-up cost is underlined
by the following example. We assume two otherwise identical energy utilities, with
one having a ramp-up cost of 15 e /MW (25% percentile) and the other 40 e /MW
(75% percentile). We further assume a capacity of 1,000 MW for both firms. Thus,
a start of their production assets costs on average 15,000 e for the flexible firm
and 40,000 e for the less flexible firm. Assuming an electricity price of 30 e /MWh
and variable cost of 25 e /MWh, both firms generate hourly profits of 5,000 e .
Thus, the power plants of the flexible firms have to run three hours at full-load
until start-up cost are covered; the corresponding number for the less flexible firm is
eight hours. This example illustrates that ramp-up costs are economically relevant
for utilities. The existence of negative power prices also provides an idea of how
important flexibility is for utilities. In this context, the Web site of the European
Power Exchange states that “[n]egative prices are not a theoretical concept. Buyers
are actually getting money and electricity from sellers. However, you need to keep
in mind that if a producer is willing to accept negative prices, this means it is
less expensive for him to keep their power plants online than to shut them down
and restart them later.” Overall, production flexibility offers real benefits for firms
as they can stop production as soon as prices fall below variable cost. This leads
to frequent starts and stops of flexible power plants in practice, dependent on the
current electricity price.16
3.5. Miscellaneous
To further challenge the results’ robustness, we apply system-GMM estimation
with lagged leverage as independent variable. This allows us to capture the dynamic
16Unreported results also show that higher production flexibility is associated with a lower number
of hours in which a specific technology was connected to the electricity transmission system (based
on data from the NERC). This provides further indication that energy utilities consider production
flexibility in their production decisions.
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nature of the firm’s debt-equity choice (e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006). As simple
OLS estimation is not appropriate in this context, we apply the system-GMM esti-
mator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998).17 Results are reported in Table A3.
The estimated adjustment speed is similar to that in O¨ztekin and Flannery (2012),
who analyze a worldwide, multi-industry sample. For production flexibility, we
again find that higher flexibility increases leverage. Furthermore, we apply Market
leverage and Long-term book leverage as alternative leverage definitions. Results are
shown in Table A4. Overall, our result of a positive relationship between production
flexibility and leverage does not depend on any specific leverage definition.
4. Identification Strategies
4.1. Deregulation and privatization
There are two reasons why privatization of energy utilities and the deregulation
of electricity markets over the last decades can be used for identification. The first is
that energy utilities have been mostly publicly owned before privatization (Dewen-
ter and Malatesta 1997). They profited from loan guarantees and access to capital
via the state. Thus, factors like political preferences, not financing constraints, de-
termined the choice of production technologies of publicly owned energy utilities.18
The second reason is related to the fact that many countries deregulated the energy
industry in the 1990s. Before that, even the construction of very expensive power
plants, for example, nuclear plants, was virtually riskless because markets were not
competitive. Hence, costs could be recovered from costumers by cost-plus pricing.
In such a business environment, financing constraints were unlikely because future
17Two- to four-period lags of the right-hand side variables are used as instruments. For the
production flexibility variables, we use the values as of 1995 as instruments (cf. Section 4.1). We
apply both the one-step and the asymptotically more efficient two-step system-GMM version. As
standard errors might be downward biased in the latter case, they are adjusted with the finite
sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).
18For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) state that energy utilities had “implicit or explicit
loan guarantees enabling them to borrow at favorable rates, or they may borrow from the govern-
ment itself at favorable rates” (312). Two important exceptions in this context are the United States
and Japan. Investor-owned energy utilities accounted for the majority of electricity production in
the United States since the 19th century (Masten 2010). Japan privatized energy utilities in 1951.
Excluding these countries from our empirical tests leads to similar results.
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cash flows were highly predictable. It is thus reasonable to assume that the pro-
duction technology decision was not driven by financing constraints, but by other
factors, such as political preferences. In this context, Peltzman and Winston (2000),
121, state that “[o]ne of the potential benefits of creating competitive decentralized
markets for wholesale power is to bring these politicized resource planning process
to an end [...].”
Both reasons indicate that financing constraints were unlikely to have had any
impact on the production assets of state-owned and/or highly regulated energy utili-
ties. Hence, using before-privatization and deregulation production assets to explain
the after-privatization capital structure reduces endogeneity concerns as they are
plausibly independent of financing decisions. In our empirical design, we perform
an IV regression with flexibility measures as of 1995 as instruments.19 Results are
reported in Table 8, models 1 and 2. Production flexibility values as of 1995 have a
high statistical and economic significance in explaining contemporaneous flexibility
values. As before, higher production flexibility leads to higher financial leverage.
— Table 8 about here —
Alternatively, we consider only utilities located in the E.U. countries (plus Nor-
way and Switzerland), which started electricity exchanges as a last step of liberal-
ization between 1995 and 2003. We focus on E.U. countries because they underwent
a rather homogeneous deregulation process (cf. Section 3.3.3 for a description). As
the speed of deregulation was different across countries, we identify those countries
that started a power exchange before 2003. Furthermore, we consider only firm-years
after 2004 to ensure that the exchanges have been already in place for some time.
The results in models 3 and 4 again provide strong evidence that higher production
19This year is chosen because power plants that were in operation in 1995 have been largely
planned and constructed before the start of deregulation and privatization. Production assets for
the year 1995 are derived from the 2002 edition of the WEPP database, which is the earliest edition
available. All units with a start of commercial operation later than 1995 are excluded. Nevertheless,
as argued in Section 2.2, using ownership information as of 2002 for 1995 can cause a bias. We
argue, however, that this bias should be small.
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flexibility leads to higher leverage.
However, one might still argue that endogeneity biases our results because we
cannot “prove” that production flexibility before liberalization and deregulation was
completely independent of financing decisions. Although we do not believe that this
is likely, there might be reasons why, for example, governments aligned highly flexible
production assets to energy utilities with high or low leverage ratios. Furthermore,
high persistence of production assets and financial leverage over time may threaten
this identification strategy. Consequently, we also present an alternative IV strategy
in the next section.
4.2. Coal, gas, and oil reserves as instruments
Roberts and Whited (2013) argue that “[g]ood instruments come from biological
or physical events or features” (514). As alternative instruments, we thus apply
physical features of U.S. states, that is, their natural reserves of coal, gas, and oil.
We argue that the natural resources of a state influence the average production
flexibility of the energy utilities located there. In particular, higher gas reserves
are expected to increase the probability that gas-fired power plants are built, thus
increasing local production flexibility. The opposite is true for coal reserves, which
should lead to less flexible power plants. For oil reserves, we expect no direct impact
on energy utilities’ production facilities because oil-fired power plants are uncom-
mon in the United States. By contrast, oil reserves may increase energy demand,
for example, due to energy intensive refineries. Higher energy demand leads to more
large-scale base-load power plants, which are less flexible. At the same time, reserves
of natural resources are very unlikely to influence firms’ financing decisions via other
channels than via production flexibility. Using data for reserves as of 1995 further
mitigates concerns about a direct impact.20 To reduce a possible impact of regula-
20Data are obtained from the EIA. We rely on the U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural
Gas Liquids Reserves 1996 Annual Report and the Coal Industry Annual Report 1995. For oil and
gas reserves, both on and offshore reserves of a state are considered. We focus on dry natural gas
reserves. For coal, we exclude states for which data on reserves are withheld. If a state is listed as
miscellaneous, we assume that there are no reserves.
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tion, we restrict the sample to firms located in states with liquid wholesale markets
for electricity (cf. Section 3.3.2). Furthermore, we include the yearly gross state
product (GSP) and unemployment rate to control for differences in local economic
conditions that may be related to natural reserves.
Results can be found in Table 9. First-stage regressions indicate that gas reserves
increase production flexibility. Oil reserves have a contrary effect. For coal, we find
no significant impact on production flexibility. All these findings are in line with our
expectations. The Kleibergen-Paap rK Wald F statistic (Kleibergen and Paap 2006)
indicates no weak instruments problems for both measures of production flexibility.
The second-stage regressions confirm our prior findings. Thus, this test further
mitigates endogeneity concerns.
— Table 9 about here —
4.3. Omitted variables of production technologies
So far, we presented two identification strategies that focus on a possible simul-
taneity bias. However, our results may also be affected by omitted factors of different
power plant types that are correlated with production flexibility. For example, gas-
fired power plants could increase leverage because they are less expensive and easier
to sell in case of financial distress, and not because of their high production flexibil-
ity. Thus, we now investigate the impact of asset salability, regional diversification,
technology concentration, asset lifetime, and asset age. Results for run-up time are
reported in Table 10; similar findings for ramp-up cost can be found in Table A5.
— Table 10 about here —
4.3.1. Asset salability. Financing decisions may also be affected by asset salability
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Benmelech 2009; Campello and Giambona 2013). If
production flexibility is correlated with asset salability, our results may reflect an
asset salability effect. As empirical proxy for asset salability, we use the capacity-
weighted average salability of firms’ power plants. A plant’s salability is defined
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as the number of other firms in the same region and year that operate plants with
the same technology. The idea behind this measure is that a higher number of
potential buyers makes it easier to sell the asset. The results in model 1 provide
no evidence for a significant impact of asset salability on financial leverage, but
unreported results based on OLS indicate a significant positive impact. For all
specifications, the influence of production flexibility remains strong.
4.3.2. Regional diversification and technology concentration. Next, we con-
trol for regional diversification and technology concentration. Higher geographical
and technology diversification may reduce firm risk and thus affect financial leverage.
Regional diversification is a dummy that equals one if a utility owns plants in more
than one country. Technology concentration is a Herfindahl index that measures
the concentration of production technologies. Results in model 2a show that re-
gional diversification has no significant impact on financial leverage. For technology
concentration, we find some evidence that firms with more concentrated produc-
tion technologies have lower leverage ratios (model 2b). The impact of production
flexibility, however, remains positive and highly significant in both models.
4.3.3. Asset lifetime and age. Asset lifetime controls for potential differences in
plants’ lifetimes. For instance, highly flexible plants may have shorter lifetimes,
which could affect our findings for production flexibility. Asset lifetime is calculated
using the historical lifetimes in the WEPP database.21 For the empirical test, we
consider two perspectives: total lifetime (i.e., at the beginning of commercial oper-
ation) and remaining lifetime. Total lifetime may have an impact due to financing
decisions at the time of construction; remaining lifetime focuses on financing deci-
sions during the plants’ lifetimes. Results are reported in model 3. Neither of the
two measures for asset lifetime has a significant impact. Asset age controls for differ-
ences in investment cycles and is defined as the capacity-weighted average age of the
21Therefore, we identify plants that became inactive, subtract the start year, and average across
all plants of a particular technology class. The average capacity-weighted lifetime is then calculated
in the same way as our proxies for production flexibility.
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plant portfolio (model 4a). Additionally, we also include age quintiles in model 4b,
allowing us to control for any nonlinear impact of age. Again, we find no evidence
that plants’ age has any impact on financial leverage. Unreported results based on
OLS indicate a negative relationship between asset age and leverage. Our results for
production flexibility, however, remain highly significant across all specifications.
4.4. Technological evolution of gas-fired plants
As an alternative test to mitigate concerns about omitted variables, we exploit
the technological evolution of gas-fired power plants during our sample period. Gas-
fired power plants experienced a massive increase in efficiency and flexibility during
the 2000s. Based on EIA data for average operating heat rates, the efficiency of
installed gas-fired power plants increased from about 37% in 2002 to 42% in 2009
(EIA 2012, 166). With increasing efficiency, the plants also became more flexible,
that is, cycling times were reduced.22 The efficiency of operated coal-fired plants
remained rather unchanged throughout our sample period, with values of about
33%. Figure 3A provides a graphical illustration.
We expect there to be an increasing impact of gas-fired power plants on financial
leverage over time due to the increased production efficiency and/or flexibility. For
coal-fired plants, which we use as a placebo test, we expect no time pattern. For
this test, we perform yearly regressions and explain leverage by the fraction of gas-
or coal-fired power plants (and the usual control variables). After that, we plot the
yearly coefficients for these fractions in Figure 3. The empirical results show that
the positive impact of gas-fired power plants increased over time (Figure 3B). For
coal-fired power plants, we find no time pattern (Figure 3C). Thus, the efficiency
and flexibility of gas-fired power plants drive financial leverage, and not not the
gas-fired power plants themselves.
To distinguish whether the increasing impact is driven by the increase in flexi-
bility or efficiency, we exploit variation in gas and electricity prices across countries
22For example, Siemens started a special project called FACY (FAst CYcling) in the early 2000s
to shorten plant start-up times.
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and states. Data come from the IEA for all countries, except for the United States,
for which data come from the EIA. We find that gas and electricity prices per se
have little impact on the relationship between gas-fired power plants and financial
leverage. As prices change the profitability and thus the implicit efficiency of power
plants, the increasing impact of gas-fired power plants during our sample period is
driven by an increase in production flexibility, not efficiency. As omitted variables
are unlikely to be correlated with this increase, this test further reduces endogeneity
concerns.23
— Figure 3 about here —
4.5. Electricity price and recapitalization cost
Next, we analyze how electricity price characteristics and recapitalization cost
affect the impact of production flexibility on leverage. This helps to mitigate endo-
geneity concerns if our findings are in line with theoretical expectations, as alterna-
tive explanations/omitted variables are unlikely to lead to such results.
Mauer and Triantis (1994) argue that the impact of production flexibility on
leverage increases with the volatility of the product price. The fact that energy
utilities sell mainly one product, that is, electricity, allows us to test this empirically.
Because there is no comprehensive database available, data on electricity prices
around the world are obtained from the Web sites of electricity exchanges, directly
from the exchanges, or from Thomson Reuters. Data on hourly spot prices, which
provide a more comprehensive picture than daily prices, are available for electricity
markets in twenty-three countries.24 Firms are matched to these markets based on
the location of their headquarters. The volatility of the hourly electricity price is
23In addition to the graphical analysis, we also perform statistical tests and find that the slopes
of the linear fits in (c) and (d) are statistically not different from zero, whereas the slope of the
linear fit in (b) is positive and statistically different from (c) and (d).
24These are Australia (AMEO New South Wales, AMEO Queensland, AMEO South Australia,
AMEO Victoria), Austria, Belgium, Canada (AESO, MISO, OIESO), Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Singapore,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States (ERCOT,
ISO NE, MISO, NYISO, OIESO, and PJM).
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then calculated separately for each firm over its fiscal year (Volatility). Results for
the interaction with production flexibility are reported in Table 11, model 1. As
expected, the impact production flexibility increases with volatility.
We also expect that the impact of flexibility on leverage is higher if electricity
prices are similar to a firm’s marginal production cost. Again, we can test this
because we know the average electricity price in a market, and we have an approxi-
mation for firms’ average variable production cost (cf. Section 3.4.3). ∆Cost/price
is calculated as the natural logarithm of the absolute difference between the electric-
ity price over a firm’s fiscal year and its variable electricity production cost in the
same time period. Results in model 2 show that the impact of production flexibility
decreases if electricity prices are very different from variable cost.
Lastly, Mauer and Triantis (1994) predict that the impact of production flex-
ibility increases with recapitalization cost. To approximate the cost of accessing
external equity, we use the fraction of months in a country in which firms issued
or repurchased shares from McLean et al. (2009) as the main measure (Nonzero).25
Higher values of this proxy go along with lower recapitalization cost. Similar to the
prior cross-market tests, we focus on firms that are located in regions with competi-
tive wholesale markets for electricity to reduce concerns that our findings are driven
by country-level regulation. Results are presented in model 3. Run-up time and
ramp-up cost have, on average, a negative influence on leverage. As expected, this
effect is reduced by low recapitalization cost.
Overall, we provide evidence that the impact of production flexibility increases
with electricity price volatility and recapitalization cost and decreases with the ab-
solute difference between electricity price and production cost. This further reduces
endogeneity concerns as all these findings are in line with theoretical predictions.
— Table 11 about here —
25We also use alternative proxies: Access is a survey-based index measuring how easy it is for
firms to issue equity (Schwab et al. 1999). Second, we calculate the number of SEOs of nonfinancial
firms in a specific country during our sample period. Third, we use the LaPorta et al. (2006)
protection index. Results in Table A6 support the main findings.
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5. Channels
Next, we analyze the two channels in the models of Mauer and Triantis (1994)
and Aivazian and Berkowitz (1998): a higher value of tax shields and lower distress
risk.
5.1. Taxes
As explained in Section 1, both models predict that corporate taxes affect the
impact of production flexibility on financial leverage. The reason is that production
flexibility increases the (expected) value of interest tax shields. Our worldwide
sample allows us to test whether production flexibility has a higher impact in regions
with higher corporate tax rates.
To approximate corporate tax rates, we calculate the median effective tax rate
for each country/state and year.26 Results are reported in Table 12. Interacting
this tax rate with production flexibility for the whole sample provides evidence that
corporate taxes increase the impact of production flexibility (model 1). However,
the effect is not statistically significant for run-up time. In a next step, we split
the sample into more and less profitable firms by comparing their profitability with
the median profitability of all firms in the same country/state and year. Now we
find strong evidence for both flexibility measures that the impact of production
flexibility increases with tax rate for the subsample of profitable firms (model 3).
The coefficient for the interaction term approximately doubles compared to the full
sample. Using nominal corporate tax rates confirms the findings for more profitable
firms (see Table A7). Overall, these findings provide evidence that the tax channel
is relevant, but mainly for more profitable firms.
— Table 12 about here —
26The effective tax rate (ETR) for each firm and year is calculated as income taxes divided by
pre-tax income. We winsorize ETR at [0,1] (e.g., Chyz et al. 2013). As a robustness test, we also
use nominal corporate tax rates.
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5.2. Distress risk
Next, we investigate the impact of distress risk. Firms with inflexible produc-
tion assets may choose lower leverage due to their higher expected cost of financial
distress (cf. Section 1). If this holds true, we expect that the impact of produc-
tion flexibility is more pronounced in markets with higher probability for financial
distress. Intuitively, production flexibility should play no role for firms located in
markets without significant distress risk. In markets with high distress risk, however,
firms with more production flexibility can better react to adverse market conditions.
This reduces their expected cost of financial distress and leads to higher leverage
ratios in a classical trade-off model.
To test the default risk channel empirically, we first exploit the staggered dereg-
ulation across U.S. states. We focus on the introduction of electricity retail choice,
which ends local monopolies of energy utilities and increases their default risk. In
fact, default risk is virtually nonexistent without competition. Thus, firms with low
production flexibility also face little risk in such markets. In competitive markets
with retail choice, however, energy utilities face significant default risk. We obtain
data on the historical state-level regulation of electricity markets from EIA. Over-
all, we find that consumers could choose their electricity supplier in nineteen states
in at least one year between 1995 and 2009. Most of these states introduced retail
choice around 2000; some states, such as California, suspended it again. The dummy
Deregulation equals one in states and years with electricity retail choice.
Empirically, we start with the main sample period, which begins in 2002. As
the first sample year is after most states had already introduced retail choice, iden-
tification mainly comes from changes of production flexibility in Table 13, model 1.
We find evidence that the impact of production flexibility is stronger if retail choice
is available. However, the choice of production assets itself may be affected by
deregulation. Thus, we perform an additional difference-in-differences test with an
extended sample period starting in 1995 (model 2). To avoid the possibility that
production assets have been affected by deregulation, we use production flexibility
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values as of 1995 (cf. Section 4.1 for their construction). Again, we find that the
introduction of retail choice (and thus default risk) led to a significantly higher im-
pact of production flexibility on leverage. This provides the first evidence for the
distress risk channel.
— Table 13 about here —
As an alternative test setting, we analyze the impact of the degree of default
risk in competitive electricity markets around the globe. This also enables us to
investigate how firms’ profitability affects the importance of the default risk channel.
This is not feasible in the staggered deregulation setting because the introduction of
retail choice affected both default risk and profitability. We use three proxies for the
degree of default risk in a power market. The first proxy is the level of generation-
side competition within an electricity market. As before, higher competition is
expected to increase default risk. Our empirical proxy for the level of generation-
side competition in an electricity market and year is the Herfindahl index based on
production capacities. Higher values of this index go along with higher concentration
and lower levels of competition. Results are reported in Tables 14 and A8. Model 1
shows that the impact of production flexibility is higher in markets with higher levels
of competition. However, when we split the sample in more/less profitable firms, we
find that this effect is mainly relevant for less profitable firms.
As second aspect, we investigate the role of equity volatility, which we calculate
as the natural logarithm of the average standard deviation of equity returns of all
other firms in the same market and year. As expected, we find that production
flexibility is more important for firms operating in markets with higher volatility of
equity returns (model 2). Although we find a stronger impact for the subsample of
less profitable firms, this difference is not statistically significant.
As a third aspect, we analyze the impact of opportunities to hedge the electricity
price, which reduces firms’ distress risk. We exploit the heterogeneity of power
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hedging opportunities across different markets for this test.27 We define Hedging
as the fraction of other firms in the same power market and year that engage in
electricity price hedging. Data on the hedging behavior of individual firms are based
on their annual reports.28 Results in model 3 show that the impact of production
flexibility on leverage is less pronounced in markets in which hedging of power prices
is more common. Again, this mainly applies for less profitable firms.
— Table 14 about here —
Overall, our findings indicate that both the tax and the distress risk channel
play a role. However, their importance differs across firms. Whereas the distress
risk channel is of first-order importance for less profitable firms, the tax channel
plays a significant role in more profitable firms.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the relationship between production flexibility and
financial leverage based on a global sample of energy utilities. Detailed data on
their power plants enable us to apply direct asset-level measures for production
flexibility. Theoretically, production flexibility can increase tax benefits of debt
financing and decrease expected cost of financial distress (Mauer and Triantis 1994;
Aivazian and Berkowitz 1998). We find that firms with higher production flexibility
rely more heavily on debt financing. This is also in line with the Van Horne (1977)
hypothesis of a substitution effect between operating and financial leverage, as higher
production flexibility is associated with lower operating leverage.
For identification, we first exploit the fact that production flexibility was unlikely
to influence financing before deregulation and privatizations of energy utilities. Af-
27The liquidity of electricity future markets and thus hedging opportunities vary between different
power markets. A comprehensive discussion about problems of electricity hedging in practice is, for
instance, provided by Frestad (2012) and de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013).
28Data come from Lievenbru¨ck and Schmid (2014). This proxy has two desirable features: first,
it is outcome based and thus implicitly considers market liquidity. This is important as the formal
existence of derivatives may be an unreliable proxy for real hedging opportunities as liquidity is
often low, especially for longer maturities. Second, this proxy does not consider the hedging decision
of the firm itself to avoid endogeneity problems.
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ter that, we use an instrumental variable approach based on natural reserves of coal,
gas, and oil. These natural reserves are plausibly exogenous of financing decisions.
To further reduce concerns about omitted variables, we investigate the impact of as-
set salability, regional diversification, technology concentration, asset lifetime, and
asset age. Next, we exploit the technological evolution of gas-fired power plants and
analyze their impact over time. Lastly, we analyze how electricity price character-
istics and recapitalization cost affect the impact of production flexibility and find
results in line with theoretical predictions.
To shed light on the channel, we exploit the staggered deregulation across U.S.
states and regional differences in distress risk and corporate taxes. Overall, our
findings indicate that production flexibility affects financial leverage via lower ex-
pected cost of financial distress and higher present value of tax shields. However,
the relative importance of the channels depends on firms’ profitability: whereas the
tax channel is of first-order importance for more profitable firms, the distress risk
channel is most relevant for less profitable firms.
These findings contribute to a better understanding of the interaction between
nonfinancial firm characteristics like production assets and financing decisions. Most
importantly, our results show that firms consider their production flexibility for the
debt-equity choice. This may, for example, help to better understand the empir-
ically observed debt conservatism (Graham 2000) or leverage stability (Lemmon
et al. 2008). Furthermore, the findings reveal that the impact of firms’ external
environments on their financing decisions depends on production characteristics.
The focus on energy utilities and their power plants enables us to directly mea-
sure production flexibility, but this also comes with some limitations. The perfect
identification strategy would rely on an exogenous shock that only shifts firms’ pro-
duction flexibility. As such a shock is—to the best of our knowledge—not available,
our identification strategy is based on several alternative tests that mitigate en-
dogeneity concerns. Another important limitation is that we focus on production
flexibility as only one dimension of operating flexibility. Thus, the impact of other
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forms of real flexibility, for example, switching options, on capital structure deci-
sions cannot be answered by this paper. Although we provide evidence that our
results are not driven by utility-specific factors, the development of direct flexibility
measures for other industries is also a promising area for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics I/II: Power plants
Total in database Matched
Year Capacity [MW] Plants [#] Capacity [MW] Plants [#]
2009 4,732,739 114,664 2,468,897 52% 31,760 28%
2008 4,523,533 108,960 2,360,368 52% 29,960 27%
2007 4,307,153 103,853 2,276,957 53% 28,597 28%
2006 4,099,429 98,824 2,143,608 52% 26,976 27%
2005 3,985,039 95,541 2,060,653 52% 26,101 27%
2004 3,887,686 93,307 2,008,247 52% 25,146 27%
2003 3,787,428 90,248 1,884,869 50% 23,957 27%
2002 3,662,830 87,220 1,826,514 50% 22,327 26%
This table shows the total number and capacity of power plants in the
edition of the Platts WEPP database in the respective year (Columns 1 and
2). The last four columns show these figures only for power plants that are
matched to firms in our sample.
35
Table 2: Production technologies
Technology Run-up time Ramp-up cost Fixed cost Fraction
(hours) (e /MW) (%) (%)
Biogas 0.25 B 32.22 Z 31.2 Z <1
Biomass 2.00 B 46.96 Z 61.0 G <1
Coal 3.00 A 46.96 F 67.9 G 31.7
Hydro 0.08 E 0.00 Z 92.2 G 12.1
Gas 0.25 C 25.45 Z 32.4 G 15.3
Gas comb. cycle 1.50 A 32.22 E 31.2 G 8.5
Geothermal 0.00 Z 0.00 Z 100 G <1
Lignite 6.00 A 35.75 F 70.0 Z 2.7
Nuclear 40.00 A 132.92 F 87.6 G 11.8
Oil 0.08 D 25.45 F 21.9 D 7.7
Pump storage 0.02 E 0.00 Z 92.2 Z 3.1
Solar 0.00 Z 0.00 Z 100 G <1
Waste 12.00 B 46.96 Z 67.9 Z 4.5
Wind 0.00 Z 0.00 Z 100 G 2.3
Run-up time is measured in hours and refers to warm starts in the case of thermal
power plants. Values are based on Eurelectric’s “Flexible Generation: Backing-up
Renewables,” p. 19, (marked with A), Danish Energy Agency’s “Technology Data
for Energy Plants” (B), and Swider (2006) (C). The run-up time of oil power plants
is based on company Web sites, e.g., life cycle power solutions provider Wärtsilä (D).
The values for hydro and pump storage power plants are based on data from Duke
Energy, FirstGen, and MWH Global (E). We also have to make some assumptions
(marked with Z). The run-up time for solar and wind is zero because these plants
are usually not actively dispatched and start to produce electricity as soon as sun or
wind are available. Similarly, we assume a run-up time of zero for geothermal power
plants.
Ramp-up costs are measured in e /MW and are mainly based on Boldt et al. (2012)
(marked with F ). We assume that ramp-up costs for gas power plants equal those of
oil power plants and that ramp-up costs for geothermal, hydro, pump storage, solar,
and wind power plants are zero. For biomass and waste power plants, we assume
equal ramp-up costs as for coal plants. For biogas, we assume same cost as for gas
cc.
Fixed cost is calculated as fixed cost divided by the sum of fixed and variable cost.
Fixed cost includes O&M and financing cost. Variable cost includes fuel cost. Data
are mainly obtained from EIA (marked with G) and refer to the estimated cost of
electricity for new U.S. generation resources in 2019. We assume that the fixed cost
of lignite-fired power plants equal those of coal plants and that variable cost are
10% lower. We also assume that biogas equals gas cc, waste equals coal, and pump
storage equals hydro.
Fraction is based on the capacity of all power plants in our sample in 2009.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics II/II: Sample
Mean SD 25% 50% 75%
Run-up time 2.77 4.48 0.08 1.54 3.00
Ramp-up costs 28.05 19.46 14.95 27.88 40.26
Fixed cost [%] 0.61 0.23 0.41 0.61 0.80
Regional div. 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
Technology conc. 0.67 0.29 0.39 0.64 1.00
Asset lifetimetotal 37.29 9.06 30.30 36.31 42.83
Asset age 19.89 13.56 7.99 19.75 29.08
Asset salability 7.27 6.73 2.20 4.97 10
Volatility 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.27
Price 48.35 25.36 27.43 44.00 61.56
Leverage 0.43 0.25 0.23 0.47 0.61
Size [US$ bn] 6.21 12.56 0.21 1.19 5.43
Profitability 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.14
Tangibility 0.56 0.26 0.40 0.62 0.77
Market-to-book 2.11 2.30 1.05 1.54 2.28
This table shows the mean, standard deviation (SD), and different
percentiles for the most relevant variables. A detailed description
of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 4: Capital structure and production flexibility
Model 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c
Run-up time -0.0051*** -0.0049*** -0.0086***
(-3.49) (-3.38) (-3.50)
Ramp-up cost -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0017**
(-2.36) (-2.24) (-2.23)
Size 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.099*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.098***
(6.42) (6.18) (6.27) (6.22) (5.98) (6.30)
Profitability -0.24** -0.20* -0.26*** -0.23** -0.18 -0.26***
(-2.50) (-1.76) (-3.37) (-2.38) (-1.65) (-3.41)
Tangibility 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.10* 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.10*
(3.75) (3.64) (1.83) (3.76) (3.66) (1.85)
Market-to-book 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.012***
(3.68) (3.61) (2.99) (3.67) (3.60) (2.98)
Observations 2,242 2,242 2,242 2,242 2,242 2,242
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.36 0.15 0.37 0.36 0.15
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country year FE no yes no no yes no
Firm fixed effects no no yes no no yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Estimation models are pooled OLS (models a and b) or firm fixed effects
regressions (c). All independent variables are lagged by one period. t-statistics based on Huber/White robust
standard errors clustered by firms are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 6: Excluding technologies
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Exclusion Coal Gas Nuclear Oil Hydro/Wind/Solar
Run-up time -0.0100*** -0.0079** -0.011*** -0.0084*** -0.012***
(-2.95) (-2.08) (-3.39) (-2.77) (-3.35)
Size 0.071*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.064** 0.083***
(3.03) (3.90) (4.42) (2.46) (2.82)
Profitability -0.22** -0.23** -0.30*** -0.14 -0.44**
(-2.00) (-2.40) (-3.25) (-1.26) (-2.06)
Tangibility 0.14* 0.28*** 0.15** 0.21** 0.089
(1.70) (2.89) (2.35) (2.27) (0.99)
Market-to-book 0.0064 0.0084** 0.0064** 0.0037 0.0029
(1.50) (2.35) (2.09) (0.73) (0.46)
Observations 935 789 1,548 857 604
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.12 0.12 0.092 0.17
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Firms owning any power plant with the respective technology are
excluded. For example, only firms that do not own coal-fired power plants are included in model 1.
Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. All independent variables are lagged by one period.
t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are presented in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% level, respectively. Results for ramp-up cost
are presented in Table A2. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 9: Coal, gas, and oil reserves as instruments
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b
Coal reserves 1.45 5.58
(0.75) (0.85)
Gas reserves -0.26*** -0.51***
(-5.63) (-2.85)
Oil reserves 1.34*** 1.46*
(6.74) (1.94)
Run-up timeinstr. -0.029***
(-4.48)
Ramp-up costinstr. -0.014***
(-2.93)
Size 0.098*** 1.76*** 0.13*** 6.39***
(4.79) (4.16) (4.35) (5.41)
Profitability 0.35*** 10.3** 0.45** 24.3**
(3.10) (2.08) (2.46) (2.18)
Tangibility -0.16 -9.54** -0.22 -20.7
(-1.03) (-2.47) (-0.82) (-1.44)
Market-to-book 0.019*** 0.32** 0.023*** 0.88
(3.13) (2.31) (2.74) (1.52)
GSP -0.056 -1.52 -0.14* -8.16**
(-1.09) (-1.10) (-1.84) (-1.98)
Unempl. rate 0.0090 -0.27 0.015 0.34
(0.99) (-0.77) (1.15) (0.32)
Observations 328 328 328 328
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
K-P rk Wald F statistic 97.51 46.08
Hansen J p-value 0.42 0.72
Models a(b) show the outcome of a first- (second-) stage IV regression. In
models a(b), the flexibility measures (Leverage) are the dependent variables.
The sample is restricted to U.S. firms located in states with liquid wholesale
markets for electricity. Variation in coal, gas, and oil reserves across U.S.
states is used as an instrument. Independent variables are lagged by one
period in the second-stage regressions. K-P stands for Kleibergen-Paap (see
Kleibergen and Paap 2006). t-statistics based on Huber/White robust stan-
dard errors clustered by firms and U.S. states are presented in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 11: Electricity price and recapitalization cost
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Run-up time (RuT) -0.014*** -0.013** -0.014***
(-3.18) (-2.56) (-4.93)
Ramp-up cost (RaC) -0.0031** -0.0034** -0.0023***
(-2.22) (-2.40) (-3.22)
Volatility 0.042 0.053
(0.51) (0.80)
RuT/RaC x Vol -0.023** -0.0053**
(-2.36) (-2.26)
∆ Cost price -0.0075 -0.013*
(-1.14) (-1.83)
RuT/RaC x ∆ cost price 0.0044*** 0.0013***
(5.08) (4.77)
RuT/RaC x Nonzeroc 0.023*** 0.0093***
(4.60) (3.30)
Price 0.00057 0.00054 0.00055 0.00060
(1.26) (1.19) (1.21) (1.30)
Price x RuT/RaC -0.000044 -0.000019 -0.00015* -0.000048
(-0.59) (-0.76) (-1.76) (-1.67)
Size 0.045* 0.042 0.046* 0.041 0.061** 0.057**
(1.84) (1.70) (1.84) (1.57) (2.56) (2.34)
Profitability -0.057 -0.060 -0.064 -0.064 -0.097 -0.098
(-0.39) (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.78) (-0.79)
Tangibility 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12
(1.20) (1.18) (1.22) (1.29) (0.91) (0.90)
Market-to-book 0.0055 0.0068 0.0064 0.0068 0.0060 0.0063
(0.80) (1.03) (0.94) (0.99) (1.25) (1.37)
Observations 717 717 717 717 706 706
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.100 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. Interacted variables are
centered. RuT stands for run-up time; RaC stands for ramp-up cost. In models a(b), we interact RuT(RaC).
Volatility of hourly power prices, ∆cost/price, that is, the ln of the absolute difference between variable cost and
power price, and nonzero are interacted with production flexibility over this time period. All other independent
variables are lagged by one period. In model 3, we only include firms located in countries in which such a market
exists since 2002. t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by electricity markets are
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. A detailed
description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 12: Tax rates
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
all ROA < Mediancsy ROA > Mediancsy
Run-up time (RuT) -0.0089*** -0.010*** -0.0023
(-2.98) (-2.76) (-0.60)
Ramp-up cost (RaC) -0.0018** -0.0012 -0.0015
(-2.13) (-1.07) (-1.43)
Tax rateETRcsy 0.044 0.032 0.14 0.14 0.020 0.0077
(1.09) (0.80) (1.34) (1.40) (0.28) (0.12)
RuT x Tax rateETRcsy -0.012 0.00065 -0.023**
(-1.39) (0.032) (-2.60)
RaC x Tax rateETRcsy -0.0048*** 0.0015 -0.0092***
(-2.80) (0.41) (-3.53)
Size 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.071*** 0.073***
(6.18) (6.16) (8.63) (8.60) (2.77) (2.84)
Profitability -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.19** -0.20** -0.22 -0.23
(-2.86) (-2.95) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-1.38) (-1.44)
Tangibility 0.11* 0.11* 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.054 0.046
(1.73) (1.73) (3.37) (3.45) (0.60) (0.51)
Market-to-book 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.015** 0.016** -0.00010 0.00061
(2.67) (2.75) (2.40) (2.36) (-0.034) (0.21)
Observations 2,219 2,219 897 897 898 898
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.092 0.10
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Tax rateETRcsy is the median effective tax rate in a country/state/year.
Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. The sample split is based on the country/state/year
specific median of ROA. The subsamples do not sum to the total sample as median observations are not
considered. Interacted variables are centered. All other independent variables are lagged by one period.
t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by electricity markets are presented
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. A detailed
description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table 13: Distress risk: Staggered deregulation across U.S. states
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b
Sample period 2002 to 2009 1995 to 2009
Run-up time 0.0015
(0.61)
Ramp-up cost 0.00040
(0.60)
RuT/RaC x deregulationsy -0.0051*** -0.00088
(-3.20) (-1.21)
RuT/RaC1995 x deregulationsy -0.0056*** -0.0017**
(-3.02) (-2.22)
Size 0.017 0.016 0.051** 0.050*
(1.12) (1.08) (2.05) (1.98)
Profitability -0.17** -0.18** -0.27* -0.27*
(-2.51) (-2.52) (-1.96) (-1.93)
Tangibility -0.14* -0.14* 0.012 0.014
(-1.81) (-1.85) (0.16) (0.18)
Market-to-book 0.0078*** 0.0077*** 0.010*** 0.0097***
(4.17) (4.22) (4.13) (3.99)
Observations 530 530 920 920
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.29
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions.
All independent variables are lagged by one period. The sample is restricted to U.S. firms.
Deregulationsy equals one for U.S. states and years with electricity retail choice. The sample
period in model 1 is 2002 to 2009 and 1995 to 2009 in model 2. RuT1995 and RaC1995 refer to the
production flexibility values as of 1995. The coefficients for time-constant RuT1995 and RaC1995
are omitted in firm fixed effects regressions. t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard
errors clustered by firms are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in
Table A1.
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A: High flex B: Low flex
C: High volatility / high flex D: High volatility / low flex
E: Price >> MC F: Price << MC
Figure 1: Electricity production and production flexibility.
This figure shows how firms’ actual electricity production depends on the power price and their
production flexibility, that is, run-up time. We assume an exemplary stochastic electricity price
P over a 24-hour period (blue line) and marginal cost (MC; gray line) of electricity production.
Whenever P>MC (P<MC), the firm decides to start (stop) production. Firms with high production
flexibility (i.e., low run-up time) can start and stop production without delay. For firms with low
production flexibility (i.e., high run-up time), there is a three-hour delay between the decision to
start/stop production and actual start/stop. Situations in which a surplus (loss) is generated due
to electricity production are green (orange).
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A: Technology efficiency B: Gas-fired plants
C: Coal-fired plants D: Gas / electricty price deciles
Figure 3: Evolution of gas-fired power plants.
This figure shows how the impact of gas and coal-fired power plants on financial leverage changed
over time. The development of the average efficiency of gas-fired plants (green) and coal-fired plants
(orange) over time based on EIA (2012), p. 166, is shown in (a). The estimated impact of both
production technologies on financial leverage over time is visualized in (b) and (c). The light and
dark blue lines are linear and quadratic fits. The estimated impact of gas-fired plants on leverage
for different deciles of gas (green) and electricity prices (orange) is investigated in (d). The slopes
of the fitted lines in (c) and (d) are not statistically different from zero, whereas the slope of the
linear fit in (b) is positive and statistically different from (c) and (d).
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Appendix
Appendix A. Production Flexibility Measures Example
This section provides an example of how to calculate the main variables. For the
following example, we assume that we matched the following power plants to the
energy utility X in 2008:
Plant Capa Technology COD Run-up Ramp-up
Name MW n/a year (y) hours (h) e/MW
A 6 wind 2006 0 0
B 100 biomass 1990 2.00 46.96
C 2,000 nuclear 1980 40.00 132.92
D 1,000 gas 1975 0.25 32.22
E 1,500 gas 1990 0.25 32.22
Run-up time is defined as the average run-up time of all power plants in the
company’s portfolio. Each power plant is weighted by its capacity. The run-up time
of each power plant is based on its technology and defined in Table 2. Thus, the
variable run-up time for firm X in 2008 is calculated as follows:
Run-up timeX =
∑M
k=1 Capacityk · Run-up timek
Total capacity
= (6 · 0 + 100 · 2 + 2, 000 · 40 + (1, 000 + 1, 500) · 0.25)MW · h(6 + 100 + 2, 000 + 1, 000 + 1, 500)MW
= 80, 825MW · h4, 606MW = 17.55h.
Ramp-up costs are calculated in the same way as run-up time. The only differ-
ence is that ramp-up costs are used in the above formula instead of run-up times.
Ramp-up costsX =
∑M
k=1 Capacityk · Ramp-up costsk
Total capacity
=
(6 · 0 + 100 · 46.96 + 2, 000 · 132.92 + (1, 000 + 1, 500) · 32.22) · MW eMW
(6 + 100 + 2, 000 + 1, 000 + 1, 500)MW
= 351, 086MW · e/MW4, 606MW = 76.22e/MW
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Appendix tables
Table A1: Definition of variables
Variable Description
Main variables
Run-up time Capacity-weighted average time which is necessary to start-up a power plant
in hours. Based on the production technologies of the firms’ power plants.
Source: Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Ramp-up cost Capacity-weighted average cost for a hot start of power plant in e /MW.
Based on the production technologies of the firms’ power plants. Source:
Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Leverage Total debt [wc03255] / (Total debt [wc03255] + book value of common equity
[wc03501]). Source: Worldscope.
Control variables
Size Natural logarithm of total assets [wc029999] in U.S. dollar.
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciations, and amortizations (EBITDA)
[wc18198] / total assets [wc02999].
Tangibility Property, plant and equipment [wc02501] / total assets [wc02999].
Market-to-book Market capitalization [wc08001] / book value of common equity [wc03501].
Market/country characteristics
Volatility Standard deviation of log returns of hourly electricity prices during the firm’s
fiscal year. Source: Calculations based on hourly electricity prices.
∆cost/price Natural logarithm of the absolute difference between the mean electricity
price and the firm’s average variable cost for electricity production. Source:
Calculations based on hourly electricity prices and EIA data.
Price Mean of the hourly electricity spot price in USD/MWh over the firm’s fiscal
year. Source: Calculations based on hourly electricity prices.
Non-zeroc Fraction of months in a country in which firms issued or repurchased shares.
Source: McLean et al. (2009).
ln(SEO)c Natural logarithm of the number of SEOs of nonfinancial firms in a specific
country during the sample period. Source: Calculations based on Thomson-
Reuters.
Accessc Survey-based index measuring how easy it is for firms to issue equity. Source:
McLean et al. (2012) based on Schwab et al. (1999).
Protectionc Principal component of the indices disclosure requirements, liability stan-
dards, and antidirector rights. Source: McLean et al. (2012) based on La-
Porta et al. (2006).
Tax rateETRcsy Median effective tax rate in a country/state and year. Effective tax rate is
calculated as income taxes [wc01451] divided by pretax income [wc01401]. It
is winsorized at [0,1].
Tax rateNOMcy Nominal corporate tax rate in a country/year. We use the yearly values from
2006 on; before that, we use the tax rate as in 2006. Source: KPMG.
Deregulationsy Equals one in U.S. states and years with electricity retail choice. Source:
Based on EIA data.
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Definition of Variables - continued
Variable Description
HHImy Herfindahl index for competition in a power market. Calculated as the sum of
the squared capacity fractions of all sample firms in a specific power market
and year. Source: Calculations based on the WEPP database.
Equity volatilitymkt Natural logarithm of the average standard deviation of equity returns of all
other firms in the same power market and year. Calculated if at least three
observations are available. Source: Datastream.
Hedgingmy Fraction of other firms in the same power market (and year) which engage
in power hedging. Calculated if at least three observations are available.
Source: Hand-collected.
Other plant-related variables
Operating cost Costs of goods sold [wc01051] plus selling, general, and administrative ex-
penses [wc01101] divided by total assets. Source: Worldscope.
Fixed cost [%] Total fixed cost, that is, fixed O&M cost and capital cost, divided by total
fixed cost plus total variable cost. Source: Our own calculations based on
EIA data.
Variable cost Average variable cost for electricity production in USD/MWh. Source: Our
own calculations based on EIA data.
Salability Capacity-weighted average salability of plants. Plant-specific salability is
defined as the number of firms in the same country/state and year which
operate plants with the same technology. Source: Our own calculations
based on the WEPP database.
Regional diversificat. Equals one if company has power plants in more than one country. Source:
Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Technology concentr. Herfindahl index which measures concentration of production technologies.
Value of one means that the firm only has one single production technology.
Source: Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Asset lifetime Capacity-weighted average expected lifetime of the firm’s assets in the re-
spective year in years. Calculated as total and remaining lifetime. Source:
Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Asset age Capacity-weighted average age of the firm’s assets in the respective year in
years. Source: Our own calculations based on the WEPP database.
Misc
Public ownership Dummy variable which equals one if the state or a federal entity are among
the three largest shareholders in a specific year and zero otherwise. Source:
Thomson Reuters Global Ownership database.
Market leverage Total debt [wc03255] / (Total debt [wc03255] + book value of common equity
[wc08001])
Long-term book lev. Long term debt [wc03251] / (Total debt [wc03255] + book value of common
equity [wc03501])
abs[ln()] Empirical proxy for volume flexibility (MacKay 2003). Calculation is based
on the following estimation for each firm with more than two observations:
ln(cashflow)t = α+  ln(output)t + ut. Source: Our owwn calculation.
Coal reserves Recoverable coal reserves at producing mines in 1995. Measured in billion
short tons. Source: EIA, Coal Industry Report 1995.
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Definition of Variables - continued
Variable Description
Gas reserves Dry natural gas proved reserves in 1995. Measured in trillion cubic feet.
Source: EIA, U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves
1996 Annual Report.
Oil reserves Crude oil proved reserves in 1995. Measured in billion barrels of 42 U.S.
gallons. Source: EIA, U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids
Reserves 1996 Annual Report.
GSP Natural logarithm of the yearly gross state product for U.S. states, in chained
2009 dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Unemployment rate Yearly, nonseasonally adjusted average unemployment rate for U.S. states.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table A2: Excluding technologies: Ramp-up cost
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Exclusion Coal Gas Nuclear Oil Hydro/Wind/Solar
Ramp-up cost -0.0015** -0.0014* -0.0019*** -0.0014** -0.0033***
(-2.06) (-1.71) (-3.04) (-1.98) (-3.68)
Size 0.067*** 0.087*** 0.077*** 0.062** 0.080***
(2.86) (3.85) (4.24) (2.35) (2.75)
Profitability -0.21** -0.23** -0.30*** -0.14 -0.44**
(-1.97) (-2.38) (-3.23) (-1.23) (-2.07)
Tangibility 0.15* 0.28*** 0.15** 0.21** 0.097
(1.73) (2.91) (2.37) (2.29) (1.06)
Market-to-book 0.0062 0.0085** 0.0062** 0.0034 0.0030
(1.45) (2.38) (2.05) (0.66) (0.46)
Observations 935 789 1,548 857 604
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.12 0.12 0.090 0.17
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Firms owning power plants with certain technologies are excluded.
For example, only firms that do not own coal-fired power plants are included in model 1. Estimation
models are firm fixed effects regressions. All independent variables are lagged by one period. t-statistics
based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are presented in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% level, respectively. A detailed description of
all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table A3: System-GMM estimation
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b
System-GMM 1-step 2-step
Run-up time -0.011*** -0.0091*
(-2.90) (-1.88)
Ramp-up cost -0.0037*** -0.0026*
(-3.37) (-1.87)
Leverage 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.70***
(17.6) (15.0) (11.8) (9.91)
Size 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.019** 0.028**
(2.63) (3.33) (2.00) (2.06)
Profitability -0.37** -0.37** -0.34** -0.37**
(-2.28) (-2.28) (-2.12) (-2.24)
Tangibility 0.056 0.044 -0.013 0.0050
(0.86) (0.62) (-0.19) (0.062)
Market-to-book 0.012** 0.010** 0.0078 0.0064
(2.54) (2.08) (1.50) (1.13)
Observations 2,243 2,243 2,243 2,243
Hansen-J p-value 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.41
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. All models are system-GMM estima-
tions (Blundell and Bond 1998). Two- to four-period lags of the right-hand-
side variables are used as instruments. Values as of 1995 are used as instru-
ments for production flexibility. Robust standard errors are applied in the
one-step system-GMM version. As standard errors might be downward biased
in the asymptotically more efficient two-step system-GMM version, they are
corrected for the finite sample bias (Windmeijer 2005). t-statistics are pre-
sented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and
10% level, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in
Table A1.
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Table A4: Leverage definition
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b
Market leverage Long-term book leverage
Run-up time -0.0056** -0.0079***
(-2.04) (-3.43)
Ramp-up cost -0.0013 -0.0017**
(-1.60) (-2.32)
Size 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(6.00) (6.04) (5.07) (5.17)
Profitability -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.18*** -0.19***
(-3.97) (-4.00) (-3.30) (-3.38)
Tangibility 0.035 0.035 0.11** 0.11**
(0.61) (0.62) (2.05) (2.06)
Market-to-book -0.0029 -0.0028 0.0066* 0.0066**
(-0.71) (-0.70) (1.96) (1.97)
Observations 2,248 2,248 2,250 2,250
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.096 0.095
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Market leverage in model 1 and Long-term book
leverage in model 2. Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. All
independent variables are lagged by one period. t-statistics based on Hu-
ber/White robust standard errors clustered by firms are presented in paren-
theses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% level,
respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table A6: Recapitalization cost: Additional measures
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Run-up time (RuT) -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.012***
(-5.32) (-5.76) (-3.16)
Ramp-up cost (RaC) -0.0029** -0.0033** -0.0017**
(-2.74) (-2.50) (-2.65)
RuT/RaC x ln(SEO)c 0.0036 0.0014*
(1.70) (1.91)
RuT/RaC x Accessc 0.015*** 0.0031*
(3.22) (1.85)
RuT/RaC x Protectionc 0.014*** 0.0070***
(3.42) (5.47)
Size 0.059** 0.055** 0.061** 0.057** 0.061** 0.058**
(2.54) (2.28) (2.68) (2.35) (2.58) (2.43)
Profitability -0.088 -0.089 -0.089 -0.093 -0.094 -0.093
(-0.72) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.75)
Tangibility 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
(0.97) (0.91) (0.83) (0.83) (0.88) (0.87)
Market-to-book 0.0067 0.0071 0.0068 0.0076 0.0065 0.0069
(1.44) (1.58) (1.50) (1.68) (1.37) (1.49)
Observations 727 727 694 694 694 694
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. Interacted variables
are centered. RuT stands for run-up time; RaC stands for ramp-up cost. In models a(b), we interact
RuT(RaC). Measures for recapitalization cost are interacted with production flexibility over this time period.
All other independent variables are lagged by one period. We only include firms located in countries in
which such a market exists since 2002. t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered
by electricity markets are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and
10% level, respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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Table A7: Tax rates: Nominal tax rates
Model 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
all ROA < mediancy ROA > mediancy
Run-up time (RuT) -0.0092*** -0.011*** 0.0024
(-2.97) (-2.84) (0.62)
Ramp-up cost (RaC) -0.0017** -0.0014 -0.00059
(-2.12) (-1.24) (-0.77)
Tax rateNOMcy -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.54 -0.46 -0.34 -0.36*
(-3.03) (-3.09) (-1.50) (-1.42) (-1.60) (-1.76)
RuT x Tax rateNOMcy 0.025 0.064 -0.11***
(0.69) (1.08) (-2.83)
RaC x Tax rateNOMcy -0.0028 0.0080 -0.022***
(-0.43) (0.89) (-3.75)
Size 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(5.93) (5.92) (7.49) (7.47) (2.76) (2.80)
Profitability -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.23** -0.23** -0.20 -0.19
(-3.16) (-3.19) (-2.60) (-2.61) (-1.35) (-1.31)
Tangibility 0.11* 0.11* 0.19** 0.19** 0.059 0.062
(1.71) (1.75) (2.52) (2.58) (0.72) (0.76)
Market-to-book 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.017** 0.019** -0.00041 -0.00059
(2.69) (2.68) (2.47) (2.49) (-0.13) (-0.19)
Observations 2,227 2,227 1,003 1,003 1,003 1,003
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.10 0.11
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variable is Leverage. Tax rateNOMcy is the nominal corporate tax rate in a country/year.
Estimation models are firm fixed effects regressions. The sample split is based on the country/year-
specific median of ROA. The subsamples do not sum up to the total sample as median observations
are not considered. Interacted variables are centered. All other independent variables are lagged by
one period. t-statistics based on Huber/White robust standard errors clustered by electricity markets
are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% level,
respectively. A detailed description of all variables can be found in Table A1.
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